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upon it in the State of Colorado. The plaintiffs moved the court 
for an order permitting them to amend the process in question, 
which had already been served upon Skychoppers of Colorado. The 
trial court denied this defendant's motion to quash and granted 
plaintiffs' motion to amend. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
This interlocut_ory appeal involves only the defendant 
Skychoppers of Colorado which seeks a reversal of the trial court' 
orders to the effect that the trial court be ordered to deny 
plaintiffs' motion to amend process and to grant this defendant's 
motion to quash the process served upon it. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action arises out of a helicopter accident which 
occurred in the State of Colorado on August 8, 1974 (R. 3, para. 
4 & 5). Plaintiffs filed a complaint against all defendants on 
August 7, 1978 (R. 2), which was served on Skychoppers of Colora& 
in the State of Colorado on August 15, 1978 (R. 10). The summons 
served upon Skychoppers of Colorado provided that the complaint 
attached thereto be answered within twenty (20) days (R. 9), rath 
than thirty (30) days as required by Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 19) 
as amended. 
On April 7, 1980, Skychoppers of Colorado appeared special: 
in this action by filing a motion to quash the process served ~a 
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it for the reason that said process did not comply with the juris-
dictional requirements of Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as 
amended (R. 11). A hearing on said motion was held before the 
Honorable Bryant H. Croft, District Judge, on April 11, 1980 
(R. 14). At the time of said hearing, plaintiffs filed a motion 
for leave to amend the process which previously had been served 
upon this defendant (R. 15-16). 
On April 14, 1980, Judge Croft entered orders, in the form 
of a memorandum decision (R. 17), denying Skychoppers of Colorado's 
motion to quash the process served upon it and granting plaintiffs' 
motion to amend the sunrrnons, which had already been served, to show 
30 days rather than 20 days at the time for answering, and gave 
this defendant 30 days thereafter in which to answer the complaint. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING 
THE AMENDMENT OF A SUMMONS PREVIOUSLY 
SERVED, WHICH WAS AN ACCOMPLISHED AND 
COMPLETED ACT. 
This Court has previously distinguished the difference 
between amending a return to show what was actually done in 
effecting service of process, and attempting to retroactively 
amend the process itself. In Redwood Land Company v. Kimball, 20 
Utah 2d 113, 433 P.2d 1010 (1967), this Court granted a petition 
for an interlocutory appeal to review an order of the trial court 
denying a motion to quash service of summons because the proof of 
-3-
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service thereof was not made until eight days after the service, 
rather than within five days as required by Rule 4(g), U.R.C.P. 
The trial court held that the defect in the filing of the "return" 
was not jurisdictional and this Court affirmed, but in so doing, 
noted the difference between a defect in the proof of service and 
a defect in the service itself, in the following language: 
"We are in accord with the view adopted by 
the trial court in denying the motion: That 
the defect she complains of is not juris-
dictional. It is with respect to the 
correctness of the summons itself, and the 
due service, which notifies the defendant 
that he is bein sued, and b which ·uris-
iction over im is re uired, that there must 
be strict comp iance. See 2 Am. Jur. 39; 
Utah Sand and Gravel Products Corp. v. 
Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.2d 703. How-
ever proof of the fact that such service has 
J ' ' been made, also referred to as the return 
of the summons, is something of a different 
character. Its only purpose is to supply the 
information to the court, the interested 
parties and their attorneys, that the defendant 
has been so served. (Authorities cited) 
* * * 
"When the procedure proscribed for the 
acquisition of jurisdiction of the defendant 
has been properly carried out, that is, when 
there has been a correct service of a ro er 
summons, a mistake or irregu arity o the kind 
shown here in the proof of service does not 
destroy the validity of the service itself." 
(Emphasis added.) 
In the case at bar, there was not correct service of a 
proper summons, since, as set forth in the following point, the 
sunnnons incorrectly stated the statutorily prescribed time period 
for answering the Complaint attached thereto. Therefore, the 
-4-
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trial court erred in per~itting the plaintiffs to "amend" a 
sunnnons which had been issued, served and returned some twenty 
months earlier. 
In their motion to amend the process, plaintiffs make the 
absurd statement "That the granting of plaintiffs' Motion to Amend 
would in no way prejudice the rights of the defendant, Skychoppers 
of Colorado." (R. 16, para. 5). This defendant had not been served 
with a proper sunnnons prior to the expiration of the applicable 
1/ 
four-year statute of limitation- and, therefore, was not subject 
to any liability in this action. By allowing plaintiffs to amend 
the service of process (an act which had already taken place), 
the trial court effectively extended the statute of limitations 
in this action. The complaint in this matter was filed on the 
last day before the controlling four-year statute of limitation 
ran. A new complaint cannot now be filed; and a new summons 
cannot now be issued on the original complaint, since such issu-
ance would not be within three months as required by Rule 4(b) U.R.C.P. 
See, Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, 25 Utah 2d 65, 
475 P.2d 1005 (1970); Cook v. Starkley, 548 P.2d 1268 (Utah 1976). 
It is difficult to conceive of a more prejudicial situation than 
having a statute of limitation period extended after it has run. 
1/ 
- Section 78-12-25, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
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In Utah Sand & Gravel Products v. Tolbert, 16 Utah 2d 407, 402 P.l 
703 (1965), the court made the following observations regarding 
our rules of civil procedure: 
"It is true that our new rules of civil 
procedure were intended to eliminate undue 
emphasis on technicalities and to provide 
liberality in procedure to the end that 
disputes be heard and determined on their 
merits. However, this does not mean that 
procedure before the courts has become en-
tirely 'without form and void.' The law 
itself is a system of rules designed to 
safeguard rights and preserve order, and 
administration of justice under it must 
necessarily be carried on with some 
degree of order. This can be accomplished 
only by compliance with the rules established 
for that purpose. Liberality in their 
interpretation and application should be 
indulged where no prejudice or disadvantage 
to anyone results, but where failure to com-
ply with the rules will result in some sub-
stantial prejudice or disadvantage to a 
¥arty, thet should be adhered to with 
idelity."_/(Ernphasis added.) 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING 
TO QUASH THE SUMMONS WHICH HAD 
BEEN SERVED UPON THIS DEFENDANT 
SINCE IT IMPROPERLY DESIGNATED 
THE TIME REQUIREMENT FOR ANSWERING. 
While the case of Winters v. Hughes, 3 Utah 443, 24 Pac. 7) 
(1861), may be of more historical interest than anything else, i: 
2/ 
- In support of this principal, the court footnoted the following 
cases: Taylor v. E. M. Royle Corp., 1 Utah 2d 175. 264 P.2d 
279 (1953); and Holton v. Holton, 121 Utah 451, 243 P.2d 438 
(1952); Thomas v. District Court, 110 Utah 245, 171 P.2d 667 
(1946); Glasmann v. 2nd Dist. Ct., 80 Utah 1, 12 P.2d 361 (1932 
-6-
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does show that this Court long ago established the legal require-
ment that a summons must properly set forth the time and place 
the defendant is required to answer or def end the charge being 
made against him. In dicta the court there observed: 
" ... it is unnecessary to consider whether 
the court erred in overruling the motion to 
quash the writ, and we only do so for the 
purpose of settling the practice. Section 
2 of the Revised Laws provides 'that when 
a complaint is filed the court shall issue 
to the defendant a notice containing a copy 
of the complaint, and the time and place 
for the investigation thereof.' Rev. Laws, 
133 .... The legislature can prescribe the 
manner in which a party may be brought into 
court, and the method pointed out by law 
must be substantially followed. Neither 
time nor place is mentioned, and both are 
essential under the statute to constitute 
legal notice to the defendant. 'Ten days 
after the return' is too vague and indefinite, 
and is really equivalent to leaving the time 
blank, for how is the defendant to know 
when the officer makes his return? 
..,_ 
"' 
... _ 
"' 
..,_ 
"' 
''We have no hesitation in saying that the 
court erred in overruling the motion to 
dismiss the writ. If the defendant had 
appeared and pleaded without first inter-
posing the motion, the case would be 
entirely different, but such was not 
the fact, and his motion was well taken." 
More recently this Court has held in several cases that 
all statutory requirements of the issuance and service of summons 
must be properly complied with in order to obtain jurisdiction 
over a defendant. In Murdock v. Blake, 26 Utah 2d 22, 484 P.2d 164 
(1971), the court stated: 
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"Servi· ce of sununons i·n f con ormance with 
the mode prescribed by statute is deemed jurisdictional, for it is service of 
process, not actual knowledge of the 
commencement of the action which confers 
jurisdiction. Otherwise, ~ defendant could 
never object to the sufficiency of service 
of process, since he must have knowledge 
of the suit to make such objection. The 
proper issuance and service of summons is 
the means of invoking the jurisdiction of 
the court and of acquiring jurisdiction 
over the defendant; these cannot be sup-
planted by mere notice by letter, telephone 
or any other such means." 
The "other such means" must obviously include service of a summom 
not in conformity with statutory requirements. See, Rees v. Scott 
8 Utah 2d 134, 329 P.2d 877 (1958) regarding the failure of the 
serving officer to endorse the date of service on the copy of t~ 
summons he left with the defendant. 
This Court has previously addressed this exact issue in 
Martin v. Nelson, 533 P.2d 897 (Utah 1975), in which the Court 
reversed a judgment based on a falsified return and because the 
summons served on the California defendant required answering 
within 20 rather than 30 days. The return was conclusively shown 
to be false in that it indicated that the officer which served 
the summons in the State of California had endorsed the date and 
place of service together with signing his name on the summons, b~ 
the copy of the summons actually served on the defendant showed 
such representation to be false. This Court held as follows: 
-8-
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"Service of process here was defective, not 
only because of the false return, but because 
it re uired answer in 20 da s instead of 30 
days. Such service is jurisdictional. De endant, 
as was his right, appeared specially and raised 
the point. 
"The case is remanded with instruction to 
vacate the judgment and let the parties take 
it from there." (Emphasis added.) 
Other courts which have had occasion to address the issue 
have likewise held that statutory requirements regarding the time 
for answering must be strictly complied with. In Vanover v. 
Vanover, 307 P.2d 117 (Wyo. 1957), a summons was issued and served 
upon the defendant requiring an answer the first Monday after its 
date, rather than the second, third or fourth Monday after its 
date as required by statute. In reversing judgment for the 
plaintiff, the court held: 
"The return day of the summons is thus 
made of special importance as it is from 
that day the time is computed to determine 
the day on or before which the defendant is 
required to act and it also limits the time 
within which legal service of that process 
may be made. To permit a plaintiff to trans-
gress these statutes by having the summons 
specify the return day as the first Monday 
rather than the second, third, or fourth 
Monday for its return after issuance, as 
the case may require it, would leave the 
date of defendant's answer to the whom of 
a plaintiff and allow plaintiff to flaunt 
an express law of this state. This may not 
be done. In consequence the surrnnons issued 
April 27, 1955, was defective and could not 
give the court jurisdiction of the person 
of the defendant even though it was timely 
served upon the defendant personally, as 
appears by the return." 
-9-
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In a later decision, the same day court held that a ~ 
miscalculation of when an answer was required in a service by 
publication was defective. Emery v. Emery, 404 P.2d 745 (Wyo. 
1965) at 748: 
"While counsel for appellant-wife 
has not urged the matter, we think we 
should call attention to the fact that the 
record presented to us discloses a further 
fatal defect in the service om Mrs. Emery. 
The proof of publication reflects that the 
last date of publication was July 18, 1961. 
According to the published notice, defendant 
was required to answer by August 16, 1961. 
Consequently, only 29 days were allowed for 
answer following the last day of publication, 
instead of 30 days as provided for by 
Rule 12(a), W.R.C.P. 
"This exact situation was present in 
National Supply Company v. Chittim, supra, 
and we there held the defect fatal to the 
jurisdiction of the court. See at 387 P.2d 
1012." 
Similarly, in Van Gundy v. Ellis, et al., 246 F.Supp. 802 
(U.S.D.C. S.D. Iowa 1965), the court noted regarding this issue: 
"Furthermore, the plaintiff's process 
incorrectly stated the time of required 
appearance. It has been held that this 
error in itself is sufficient to label a 
process defective. Fernekes & Bros. v. 
Case, 75 Iowa 152, 39 N.W. 238 (1888). 
Thus, the first service of process upon 
W. M. Tynan & Co. was defective. Moreover, 
it was insufficient to toll any applicable 
statute of limitations. Burkhardt v. 
Bates, 191 F. Supp. 149 (N.D. Iowa 1961); 
Fernekes & Bros. v. Case, supra." (Emphasis 
added.) 
-10-
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POINT III 
SKYCHOPPERS OF COLO~DO NEVER 
WAIVED SERVICE OF A PROPER SUMMONS 
AND THERE IS NO DEFENSE TO LACK 
OF JURISDICTION. 
The trial court in its memorandum decision of April 14, 1980 
(R. 17) made the following statement of facts, apparently in 
justification of its denial of this defendant's motion to quash 
the process served upon it. 
"Said summons was served on Skycroppers [sic] 
on August 8, 1978 and no answer or .default 
certificate has ever been filed. Defendant's 
motion to quash was filed April 7, 1980 -- some 
20 months after service. The court denies the 
motion to quash and grants plaintiffs' motion 
to amend the summons." 
However, the lower court gives no expression of a legal theory 
or doctrine arising from said facts which would support its denial 
of defendant's motion to quash. 
Also, the plaintiffs in their motion to amend the summons 
(R. 15-16) make no allegation that defendant did anything which 
would constitute a waiver of its right to contest jurisdiction 
of the court over it. In fact, plaintiffs allege only that they 
have never demanded an answer. They make no claim that the 
defendant ever represented it would not contest jurisdiction. 
Plaintiffs do state in their motion: 
-11-
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"Service of process was made on August 15, 
1978; and plaintiffs since that time have 
e~tend7d ~o de~endants through its insurer 
time within which to answer in that no answer 
would be required so long as negotiations for 
settlement were pending." (R. 16, para. 2) 
However, as a matter of fact, no settlement negotiations 
have ever been commenced. While it is impossible to cite a nega-
tive fact in the record, plaintiffs must acknowledge in their 
responding brief that neither during the four-year period betwe~ 
the time of the accident and when suit was commenced, nor during 
the twenty-month period after suit was filed until defendant movea 
to quash the summons, did plaintiffs ever make an offer of settle· 
ment to this or the other defendants in this action. 
Consequently, plaintiffs can complain of no conduct on the 
part of this defendant which has in any way prejudiced them. In 
fact, it was the plaintiffs who did not file their complaint unti: 
the day before the four-year statute of limitation period ran anc 
thereby incurred the risk that an out-of-state process server may 
not effect proper service and that such fact may not be discovered 
until it was too late to issue another summons under Rule 4(b); 
U.R.C.P. Fiberboard Paper Products Corp. v. Dietrich, supra; 
Cook v. Starkley, supra. 
The lower court decision seems to infer some affirmative 
duty on the part of the defendant to have brought its motion to 
quash earlier, but cites no legal doctrine to support such an 
I 
inference. However, because of the fact that plaintiffs waited 
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until the day before the statute of limitation ran before filing 
their complaint and since the summons must issue within three 
months after the complaint is filed, the same result would 
obtain if defendant's motion to quash had been brought ninety-one 
days after the improper service had issued. After that date, 
November 7, 1978, there is nothing plaintiffs could have done to 
remedy the defective summons which had been issued, even if such 
fact had come to their attention. 
Since it is not contended that this defendant did anything 
to waive the requirement that personal jurisdiction must be obtained 
over it by the service of a proper sununons upon it, the lower 
court erred in not granting its motion to quash. As stated in 
Rees v. Scott, supra, a defendant has no burden of showing it was 
misled by an improper summons as a prerequisite to bringing a 
motion to quash such summons. This Court therein stated: 
"We see no merit in the contention that the 
defendant has the burden to allege and prove 
that he was misled by the defect. The trial 
court properly granted the motion to quash." 
CONCLUSION 
The record, as noted above, clearly demonstrates that the 
summons served upon this defendant did not comply with the require-
3/ 
ments of the "Utah Long Arm Statute."- The record is also devoid 
of any waiver of such requirements by the defendant. Consequently, 
3/ 
- Section 78-27-27, U.C.A., 1953, as amended. 
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defendant's motion to quash the process served upon it in the 
State of Colorado should have been granted. Likewise, the lower 
court erred in permitting plaintiffs to "amend" the summons which 
had been issued, served and returned twenty months earlier. 
All facts giving rise to the problem here presented, i.e., 
filing the complaint one day before expiration of the applicable 
statute of limitation, drafting the summons requiring an answer 
in twenty rather than thirty days, indefinitely extending the 
time for answering (which went beyond the ninety days wherein a 
correct summons could have been reissued) and never making a setti 
ment offer in over five and one-half years after the accident 
occurred (which caused defendant to attempt to conclude the matter 
by litigation and thereby discover the defective service) were 
generated by and were under the control of the plaintiffs. It 
would be unjust to now require this defendant to appear and defenc 
a lawsuit which was never properly served upon it during the 
applicable period of limitation for bringing such an action. 
WHEREFORE, the defendant Skychoppers of Colorado respectful 
prays that the orders of the trial court be reversed and that tle 
surmnons which was served upon this defendant be quashed and dee::e: 
null and void. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of August, 1980. 
DAVID K. WATKISS 
H. WAYNE WADSWORTH 
of and for 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telep)tczze. +ii:l1iti63 l~OO 
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FRED C. BEGY, III 
of and for 
LORD, BISSELL & BROOK 
115 South LaSalle Street 
Chicago, Illinois 60603 
Telephone: 312/443-0371 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant 
Skychoppers of Colorado 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed, postage prepaid, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT SKYCHOPPERS 
OF UTAH to Robert W. Brandt, Esq., RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON, 
49 Post Office Place, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110, this 
August, 1980. 
Of Defendant's Counsel 
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